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Abstract: This paper has four major parts.  First is a discussion of the critical theory of technology 
offered by Andrew Feenberg in his book, Questioning Technology.  I argue that Feenberg’s theory is 
similar, in important respects, to the political theory of Machiavelli and that consequently, a 
comparison of the political philosophy of Machiavelli is possible.  Second, I discuss the political 
philosophy of Machiavelli, in particular his description of the foundation of society.  Third I discuss 
the relationship between virtue and the natural world according to Machiavelli.  Fourth, I argue that 
this comparison reveals problems for the critical theory of Feenberg.  Feenberg wants a politics and 
technology of liberation and Machiavelli shows that politics (and also technology) is always linked to 
coercion. 
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Resumen: Este artículo tiene cuatro partes.  Primero, es una discusión de la teoría crítica de la 
tecnología de Andrew Feenberg en su libro Questioning Technology.  Se defiende que la teoría de 
Feenberg es parecida, a grandes rasgos, a la teoría política de Maquiavelo, siendo posible una 
comparación con su filosofía política.  En segundo lugar, se discute, por tanto, la filosofía política de 
Maquiavelo, en particular su descripción de la constitución de la sociedad.  Tercero, se plantea la  
relación entre la virtud y el mundo natural según este autor.  En último lugar, se argumenta que esta 
comparación saca a la luz algunos problemas para la teoría crítica de Feenberg.  Este autor sostiene 
una política y una tecnología de la liberación, mientras que Maquiavelo indica que la política (y la 
tecnología) está siempre ligada a la coerción.  
Palabras clave: coerción, Teoría Crítica, Feenberg, Maquiavelo, tecnología, política, virtud 
 
 
 
In this paper, I plan to discuss Feenberg’s critical theory of technology and 
objections that can be raised to it on the basis of Machiavelli’s political 
philosophy.  This paper will proceed in four parts.  In the first part, I will present 
Feenberg’s project and make the case for Machiavelli’s relevance to this project.  
In the second part, I will analyze Machiavelli’s account of the origins of society.  
Here my goal will be to show the artificial nature of political life according to 
Machiavelli and expand on why critical theory invites a dialogue with 
Machiavelli.  In the third part I will discuss how Machiavelli understands the role 
virtù plays in forming and preserving society and how this is intimately tied to 
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his account of politics as artificial.  Finally, I will discuss how the necessity of 
coercion indicated in Machiavelli’s account presents a number of problems for 
Feenberg’s critical theory of technology, in particular his vision of a liberating or 
non-objectifying politics and technology.   
 
 
PART ONE: Political Theory and Technology 
 
The link between the developments of modern technology and politics has long 
been noted.  Around twenty years ago, G. Hottois coined the term 
‘technopolitics’ to indicate the role that political factors play in determining 
which technologies are developed and their prioritization relative to other 
technologies.1  The development and deployment of technology cannot be 
understood in purely technical terms, but must include reference to the political 
factors and decisions that inform the demand for and funding of the necessary 
research and development.  The renewed interest of various governments in 
funding research into alternative energy technology in the light of the recent rise 
in oil prices is only one example of technopolitics at work.  This connection 
between technology and politics has received many thoughtful studies; in this 
paper I will only consider that of Andrew Feenberg.  Feenberg, a student of 
Herbert Marcuse, brings the Frankfurt School’s method of philosophical 
sociology to bear on the philosophy of technology.   
In turning towards history and politics for his account of technology, 
Feenberg’s work presents an argument against both essentialism and 
determinism in the philosophy of technology.  Essentialists, broadly speaking, 
hold that technology carries within certain tendencies which are inseparable from 
technology; on the other hand, the constructivists argue that whatever tendencies 
are associated with technology are socially constructed and can be avoided or 
defused with alternate social constructs.2 In his most important work, 
Questioning Technology, Feenberg argues on various fronts that technology has 
                                                          
1 G. Hottois, “Technoscience: Nihilistic Power versus a new Ethical Consciousness”, in Durbin P.T. 
(ed.), Technology and Responsibility, Reidel, 1987, pp. 69-84. For a more systematic presentation of 
the relationship between technology and politics, see L. Winner, “Techné and Politeia: the Technical 
Constitution of Society”, in Philosophy and Technology.  Boston Studies in the Philosophy of 
Science. Paul T. Durbin & Friedrich Rapp (eds.) Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1983, pp. 97-114.  For a more 
recent discussion of the relationship between political rights and technology see L. Winner, “Is There 
a Right to Shape Technology”, in Argumentos de Razón Técnica 10, 2007, pp. 199-213 . 
2 See Andrew Feenberg, Questioning Technology, New York: Routledge, 1999, pp. 222-225, and I. 
Thomson. 'What's Wrong with Being a Technological Essentialist? A Response to Feenberg', in 
Inquiry 43. 2000, pp. 429-444. 
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no determined essence, but instead is the “systematic locus for the sociocultural 
variables that actually diversify its historical realizations.”3   Philosophers of 
technology also sometimes distinguish between instrumentalist theories of 
technology and substantivist theories of technology.4  Instrumentalist theories of 
technology hold that technologies are neutral tools to be used for either good or 
ill depending on the users.  Substantivist theories of technology hold that 
technologies determine certain ends independent of the intentions of the users.  
This distinction does not precisely reproduce the previously discussed 
essentialist/constructivist distinction; instead one could imagine a number of 
different permutations of their combination: 
(a) Essentialist instrumentalism: This view holds that technology is 
essentially a neutral tool or instrument.  Heidegger refers to this as 
the ‘instrumental and anthropological definition of technology” and 
develops his ‘Question concerning Technology’ on the basis of a 
rejection of this view.5 
(b) Essentialist substantivism: This view holds that technology is 
essentially oriented towards certain ends, independent of user’s 
intentions.  This view is closely associated with Heidegger’s own 
position.6   
(c) Constructivist instrumentalism: This view holds that technology is 
a social construct and is contingently constructed to have no 
particular ends other than that of the users; this differs from (a) by 
granting that this neutrality is contingent upon certain social 
formations rather than an essential element of technology. 
(d) Constructivist substantivism: This view holds that technology is a 
social construct, but that this construct orients technology towards 
certain ends that individual users have little to no control over.  
Any change in these tendencies presupposes a change in the society 
that conditions these ends. 
According to Feenberg a recognition of the extent to which political factors 
affect the experience of technology makes the sort essentialist and determinist 
view of Heidegger (among others) untenable.  Instead Feenberg does argues that 
sociopolitical factors play a formative role in the deployment and effect of 
                                                          
3 Feenberg, Questioning Technology, op.cit., p. 201. 
4 See, Peter-Paul Verbeek, What Things Do: Philosophical Reflections on Technology, Agency, and 
Design (trans. R.C. Crease), University Park: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005, pp. 11-12. 
5 See M. Heidegger, “The Question concerning Technology”, in The Question Concerning 
Technology and Other Essays Trans. W. Lovitt.  New York: Harper, 1977, pp. 5. 
6 See Heidegger, “Question concerning Technology”, op. cit., p. 14. 
Argumentos de Razón Técnica, nº 12, 2009, pp. 37-57  
BRIAN HARDING 
 
40
technology.  As such, Feenberg embraces (d), endorsing a historical and political 
account of technological substantivism.  However, since this ‘substance’ is 
determined by historical and political – i.e. changeable – circumstances, a change 
in the ‘substance’ of technology is possible.   For Feenberg, contemporary 
technology is conditioned by the politics of modern capitalism, and as such, its 
nature is determined by capital; any change in its use will have to be part of a 
larger change in the structure of modern capitalism.  So while Feenberg endorses 
many of Heidegger’s particular complaints about modern technology, he 
maintains that these are neither essential to technology nor determined by the 
history of being but only the result of contingent, and reformable, social 
formations.7  Feenberg’s philosophy of technology is therefore a political 
philosophy of technology insofar as his vision of a reformed technology rests on 
the hope a reformed politics.  So, Feenberg writes:  
 
The technological future is by no means predetermined.  The very 
existence of these struggles [against technology] suggests the possibility 
of a change in the form of technical rationality.  They prefigure a general 
reconstruction of modernity in which technology gathers a world to itself 
rather than reducing its natural, human and social environment to mere 
resources.  The goal would be to define a better way of life, a viable ideal 
of abundance, and a free and independent human type, not just to obtain 
more goods in the prevailing socioeconomic system8 
 
Feenberg argues that were capitalism to be rejected in favor of the sort of 
enlightened socialism endorsed by Marcuse, the negative effects of technology, 
in particular the treatment of others and nature as resource to be managed that 
Heidegger identified as an essential part the Gestell, could be minimized if not 
avoided all together.  Again, it is not technology per se that treats people and 
nature as a resource, but capitalism.   As such, Feenberg argues for a critical 
theory of technology that combines the Frankfurt School’s analysis and critique 
of later modern culture to the issues raised by contemporary technologies.  For 
Feenberg, if politics could be structured in a non-objectifying way, then 
technology could be a boon rather than a threat to the development of what he 
calls an “affirming lifestyle”.  This politics, in turn, does not claim either a trans-
historical, i.e. metaphysical or religious, justification, but instead argues for its 
superiority on pragmatic, sociological and historical terms.  In what follows I 
will argue that Feenberg has not thought through the implications of a historical 
                                                          
7 Feenberg, Questioning Technology, op. cit., pp.183-187. 
8 Feenberg, Questioning Technology, op.cit., pp. 224-225. 
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politics; a Machiavellian analysis agrees with Feenberg’s anti-essentialist 
constructivism in the philosophy of technology however his thought presents a 
number of problems for Feenberg’s claims about the possibilities of an 
emancipatory or democratic technology.  
 
 
PART TWO: The Primacy of the Political: Numa and Romulus 
 
Political life, prior to Machiavelli, was largely conceived of in terms of nature.  
The human being, Aristotle said, is a political animal.9  This was seconded by 
Cicero, who argued that we are naturally sociable, a view later endorsed by 
Augustine of Hippo: Augustine’s primary disagreement with the ancients in this 
respect is in his view that political life is not a source of happiness.10  In his 
discourse on government, the 14th century Florentine poet Dante argued that the 
superiority of monarchy could be demonstrated from first principles.  This 
demonstration rested on a philosophical account of human nature.11  So for 
Dante human beings are by nature political so that politics is, in that sense, 
natural.  Of course, in the Middle Ages certain theologians argued for the 
supremacy of papal power to that of the emperor, but this debate was not over 
whether or not political life was natural, but what the natural order of that life 
was.  The details of these medieval debates are less important for us than the 
underlying agreement between the disputants: political life rested on principles 
deducible from either philosophy or theology. The structure of political life was 
ordained either by God, nature or both. Against this long standing agreement, 
Machiavelli asserts the primacy of political reality over that of philosophical 
theories or religious belief: 
 
But since it is my intention to write a useful thing for him who 
understands, it seemed to me more profitable to go behind to the effectual 
truth of the thing, than to imaginations thereof.  And many have imagined 
republics and principates that have never been seen or known to be in 
truth; because there is such a difference between how one lives and how 
                                                          
9 Aristotle, The Politics, 1253a1-5. 
10 See Harding, Augustine and Roman Virtue, London, Continuum, 2008, pp. 130-131. Although 
Augustine suggests that hierarchical political life is due to the fall, he believes that communal life is 
natural to human beings. 
11 Dante, Monarchy (trans. P. Shaw.) in Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought,  
Cambridge, Cambridge UP, 1996, I.ii.4-8. 
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one ought to live that he who lets go that which is done for that which 
ought to be done learns his ruin rather than his preservation12 
 
The combined rejection of imagined republics and ‘how one ought to live’ serves 
to reject both philosophy and theology as grounding for politics.  Both the 
theoretical city and the heavenly city are rejected in favor of the earthly or actual 
city. It is worth noting two further points about Machiavelli’s interest in ‘la 
verità effetuale della cosa.’ First, the phrase is in the singular; the turn towards 
the effectual truth is a turn towards the singular and particular and away from the 
universal.13  Second, Machiavelli’s interest in la verità effetuale shows an 
interest in truth only insofar as it is useful for some end; against the classical 
vision of scientia as a contemplation of the highest truths, Machiavelli will want 
to focus on the practical uses of knowledge, the joining together of knowledge 
and power, which is, in a manner of speaking, technopolitics.    
As part of this turn towards la verità effetuale Machiavelli’s thought is 
developed on the basis of ‘long experience of modern things and the continuous 
readings of ancient things.’14    These ancient things are, above all else, ancient 
historians in particular Titus Livy.  Machiavelli’s Discourses on Livy presents 
itself as a study of the origins and development of the Roman Republic with an 
eye towards the presentation of ‘new modes and orders.’  As such, it is both 
antiquarian and forward looking at the same time, and because of this, one has to 
pay careful attention to Machiavelli’s use of Livy.  We can note the similarity 
between Machiavelli’s approach and that of critical theory: both look to history, 
rather than metaphysics, for an understanding of political possibilities.  
Feenberg’s mentor and inspiration, Herbert Marcuse describes his methodology 
as historicist one, where “a specific historical practice is measured against its 
own historical alternatives”15 – giving a distant and faint echo of Machiavelli’s 
more forceful pronunciation.  In his own right, Feenberg understands his critical 
theory of technology as an attempt to introduce the concrete elements of 
technology – we might say ‘la verità effetuale’ –into the philosophy of 
technology via a historicized, as opposed to metaphysical, account of the essence 
                                                          
12 Machiavelli, The Prince (Trans. L. P. de Alvarez),  Chicago: Waveland Press, 1989,  XV (49-50).  
The arabic numbers in parenthesis refer to the pagination in Niccolò Machiavelli, Opere. M. 
Bonfantini (ed.) La Letteratura  Italiana: Storia e Testi 29,  Milan, Riccardo Ricciardi, 1954. 
13 See L. Althusser, Machiavelli and Us (Trans. G. Elliott),  New York: Verso, 1999, pp. 15-17.  
14 Machiavelli, The Prince, epistle dedicatory 3. 
15 See, Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society,  
Boston, Beacon Press, 1991, xlii. Unlike Machiavelli, neither Marcuse nor Feenberg spend much 
time discussing historical events in their particularity, excepting May 1968. 
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of technology.16  Moreover, both Machiavelli and critical theory are oriented 
towards the production of practical political effects: in the case of Feenberg and 
Marcuse it is the overcoming of late modern capitalism, for Machiavelli it is the 
liberation of Italy from the foreign invaders.17  These points are worth 
emphasizing, since it shows that the application of Machiavelli to critical theory 
is not unwarranted, but invited by its own methodological claims.  As we shall 
see, Machiavelli understands the significance of this preference for history and 
the concrete more clearly than Feenberg and critical theory.   
Since Machiavelli’s historical turn is a return, above all, to Livy, a brief 
excursus on Livy is called for. His history is, above all, a didactic one.  In writing 
his history of Rome, particularly in his history of the early days of the city, Livy 
is concerned with giving his reader noble examples to imitate and base examples 
to avoid.18  Whence Livy’s concern with the heroes of Rome; but at the same 
time, the real heroes of Ab Urbe Condita are not the great Romans, but the 
virtues they embody; as P.G. Walsh puts it: 
 
Due observance of the gods (pietas), and readiness to uphold treaties and 
promises solemnly made (fides); harmonious collaboration in the body 
politic (concordia), with due deference to authority, both military and 
civic (disciplina); the application of foresight (prudentia) and reason 
(ratio) in politics and in war, and the exercise of mercy (clementia) when 
appropriate; at an individual level, the maintenance of chastity (pudicitia) 
and of courage (virtus), the need to comport oneself in accordance with 
one’s status (dignitas) and with the requisite seriousness (gravitas) and to 
espouse a simple way of life without luxury (frugalitas).  These abstract 
qualities, clothed in the accidental garb of the leaders of each generation, 
are the true and enduring heroes of the Ab Urbe Condita.19 
 
In the same way, Machiavelli will use his commentary on Livy’s history to make 
more general philosophical points through a discussion of particular events and 
                                                          
16 Feenberg, Questioning Technology, op.cit., p. 201. 
17 See Feenberg, Questioning Technology, op.cit., p. 224 and Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, op. 
cit., pp. 247-257; Machiavelli, The Prince, op. cit., XXVI, pp. 83-86; it is noteworthy that all three 
texts conclude with a call to action. On Machivelli’s desire to liberate Italy, see Althusser, 
Machiavelli and Us, op. cit., 16. 
18 Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, in R.M. Oglivie (ed.) Scriptorum Classicorum Bibliotheca Oxoniensis.  
Oxford: Clarendon, 1974, I.preface.10.  Henceforth AUC.  See the discussion in P.G. Walsh, “Livy’s 
Preface and the Distortion of History” (in The American Journal of Philology 76.4. 1955, pp. 369-
83); according to Walsh, Livy’s moralizing aims necessitated certain ‘distortions’ in his accounts of 
historical events and use of source material, bending facts and reports to fit his didactic goals.  The 
same could be said of Machiavelli’s use of Livy.  
19 P.G. Walsh, Livy: His Historical Aims and Methods, Cambridge, Cambridge UP, 1961, pp. 66.   
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characters described in Livy’s history.  Machiavelli uses Livy’s history as a 
mixture of sounding board, authority, interlocutor and teacher; to paraphrase 
Marcuse, Livy provides Machiavelli with a historical alternative against which to 
measure modern political practices.  Because of the complexities of Livy’s own 
text, and Machiavelli’s relationship to it, it is helpful when studying his 
Discourse on Livy to have the texts of Livy himself on hand so that comparisons 
can be made between Machiavelli’s discussion of certain events in Roman 
history, and the original Livian account of those events.   In what follows I will 
discuss Machiavelli’s presentation of the foundation of Roman religion and 
contrast it with the Livian account.  I will begin with a summary of Livy’s 
account. 
 Numa is credited by Livy with establishing Roman religious rites and 
priesthoods;20  Livy tells us that Numa’s invention of religious priesthoods and 
rites made him the ‘second founder of Rome.’  It is the religion of Numa which, 
to a certain extent, tamed the warlike spirit of the early Romans with the 
admixture of pietas: 
 
Fearing that without external dangers and cares which fear of enemies and 
military discipline provide, luxuriant idleness might occupy their souls, he 
reckoned the thing to lead the multitudes and efficiently civilize the rude 
was to fill them with fear of the gods.21   
 
The sole goal of Numa’s religion is to preserve the people in their military virtue 
during those times – rare in the history of Rome – when there is nobody to fight. 
22  In this case Numa’s religion is invented for purely political or social reasons: 
as a preservative of virtue.  The people should fear something, either an external 
enemy or vengeful and powerful gods; at the same time, Numa’s religion also 
offers the possibility of ‘divinization’ for great Roman heroes such as 
Romulus.23   Livy’s account of Numa suggests that Roman religion is designed 
to provide the symbols and ideas which will promote the virtues of romanitas.  
Roman religion’s function is essentially a symbolic one insofar as it is to provide 
the symbols which will mold the hearts and minds of the Romans in such a way 
that, even in the absence of enemies, civic virtue is preserved.   
                                                          
 However, the above paragraph needs to be supplemented since as it 
stands it is not an entirely accurate description of Livy’s account because it 
20 See Livy, AUC, I.18.1-I.21.6 for a discussion of Numa’s reign and religious innovations. 
21 Livy, AUC, I.19.4-5.  
22 See Livy, AUC, I.19.3. 
23 See Livy, AUC, I.16.5-8.   
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suggests that there was no religion in Rome prior to the ascension of Numa to the 
throne.  This is not the case: although Numa codified, organized and encouraged 
Roman religion, Livy does not suggest that Rome was irreligious prior to Numa.  
Instead, we find various occasions in his account of the reign of Romulus and the 
foundation of Rome where religious beliefs and practices are present.  For 
example, Romulus and Remus consult auguries when initially building the 
city24; Romulus kills Remus to defend the sanctity of the city walls,25 the 
Sabines are invited to Rome as a part of a religious festival26, and when Romulus 
dies the senate claims he had ascended to the gods. 27  Perhaps most importantly, 
Livy tells us that it was only after attending to the worship of the gods that 
Romulus gathered the multitude (multitudine) to give them his laws.  And, Livy 
emphasizes, that it is this law giving that truly united this multitude into one 
body (unius corpus).28  Roman religion cannot be said to begin simply with the 
advent of Numa, but instead Livy tells us that the very foundation of Rome was, 
at least in part, religious.  To be sure, Numa’s reign was characterized by a 
devotion to religious matters that outstripped that of Romulus, but it would be 
going too far to suggest that the political founding of Rome was an entirely 
secular affair. 
 However, this is precisely what Machiavelli’s discussion of Romulus 
and Numa in the Discourses on Livy suggests.  Machiavelli presents the Rome of 
Romulus as devoted to military affairs entirely and that of Numa as devoted to 
religion.  Rome, prior to Numa, is irreligious; its foundation rests on neither the 
gods nor nature, but on the force of Romulus.  This raises an important question 
for Machiavelli, as he wonders who is more deserving of praise: his Romulus 
who ignores religion to focus on the development of martial virtue or Numa, 
whose devotion to religion earned Rome the respect of her neighbors.29  While at 
first seeming to suggest that Numa is more deserving of praise, Machiavelli 
concludes by arguing that Romulus is superior insofar as Romulus’ martial virtue 
can stand without religion, but it would be impossible for Numa to introduce 
religion without the foundations laid by the strength of Romulus.  In chapter 
eleven of the first book of the Discourses, Machiavelli seems to argue that 
Numa’s religion is more fundamental insofar as it introduced good orders into 
                                                          
24 Livy, AUC, I.6.4. 
25 Livy, AUC, I.7.2-3. 
26 Livy, AUC, I.9.6-8. 
27 Livy, AUC, I.161-8.  
28 Livy, AUC, I.8.15. 
29 Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy (Trans. H. Mansfield and N. Tarcov), Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press, 1996, I.11, pp. 122-123. 
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the city, and where there are good orders, one can easily introduce good arms.  
However, in chapter nineteen he takes this back, saying that Numa’s Rome was 
precarious and under the sway of fortune; elsewhere, in The Prince he asserts 
that good arms are the foundation of good laws.  Romulus’ Rome, on the other 
hand was more reliant on its own virtue.  Numa, on the other hand, relied on the 
virtue of Romulus rather than his own: it was the strength of Romulus’ rule that 
allowed Numa to cultivate religion and peace.  If Tullus, the third king, was not 
closer to Romulus than to Numa, Machiavelli continues, Rome would have been 
crushed by her neighbors. 30    
Numa’s dependency on the prior accomplishments of Romulus show 
that religion, for Machiavelli, is something secondary: what is primary is the 
political, understood as the ability to project force in this world without recourse 
to the next.31  In his Florentine Histories Machiavelli has Cosimo Medici assert 
that one does not hold power (stato) with pater nosters.32 The world of politics is 
fundamentally the world of Romulus; the morality and theology espoused by 
various religions only exists in the space carved out by Romulus. Indeed, religion 
is a product of the city, rather than vice-versa; he who would act politically must 
love his city more than his soul.  This famous phrase, which Machiavelli uses in 
his account of the War of the Eight Saints in his Florentine Histories and adopts 
for himself in his letter to Francisco Vettori of April 152733 as well as the 
juxtaposition of Romulus and Numa in The Discourses, can be elucidated with 
reference to two important points Machiavelli makes in The Prince.  First, that 
all those who rely on belief as a opposed to force, i.e. unarmed prophets, come to 
                                                          
30 Machiavelli, Discourses, op. cit., I.11, p. 123 and I.19, pp. 143. 
31 Althusser’s comments are particularly apt: “He [Machiavelli] categorically does not confront 
religion with the question of its origin and religious credentials.  He considers it from an exclusively 
political, factual point of view, as an instrument, alongside the army, for the foundation, constitution 
and duration of the state. He treats it as an existing reality defined by its political function” 
(Althusser, Machiavelli and Us, op cit., p. 90).  However, he may not be entirely correct.  While 
Machiavelli does treat of religion in the manner described by Althusser, a compelling case has been 
made that he offers a more philosophically sophisticated account the origins of religion.  To treat 
religion as merely a political  tool, one must believe that it is not what it claims to be – divinely 
instituted.  The case has been made that Machiavelli subtly argues for this position as well.  For this 
case, the evaluation of which goes far beyond this paper, see L. Strauss, Thoughts on Machiavelli , 
Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1978, pp. 174-208; and H. Mansfield, Machiavelli’s New 
Modes and Orders: A Study of The Discourses on Livy, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1979, 
pp. 181-189 et passim. 
32 Machiavelli, Florentine Histories (Trans. L. Banfield & H. Mansfield), Princeton, Princeton UP, 
1988, VII.6, p. 883. 
33 Machiavelli, Florentine Histories, III.7, p. 690; and Machiavelli, The Letters of Machiavelli (Trans. 
A. Gilbert), Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1961,  #225, p. 1136. 
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ruin and second that good laws presuppose good arms.34  The two claims restate 
the argument contained in his account of Numa: the priority of good arms to 
good laws signifies the priority of force to morality and reason, the weakness of 
the unarmed prophet is the weakness of Numa.  Although Numa did not come to 
ruin, as we saw earlier, he would have had the reputation of Romulus not 
protected him.  
These two principles assert the historical priority of politics to religion, 
or more precisely, the priority of politics understood in terms of the ability to 
compel obedience to religion.  Romulus’ greatness, in Machiavelli’s Discourse, 
is found in his ability to compel obedience.  The killing of Remus stands out, for 
Machiavelli, as the greatest example of this ability and the impious lengths one 
must go to in order to obtain or exercise this ability.  In his discussion of the 
killing of Remus, the auguries mentioned by Livy are ignored, instead 
Machiavelli uses it as an opportunity to discuss the importance of being alone, un 
solo, when founding or re-organizing a regime.35  While Livy describes Romulus 
as attending to the rites of the gods prior to giving law to the Romans, 
Machiavelli focuses on Remus’ death as the founding act.  Founding, according 
to Machiavelli, requires violence.  As we shall see shortly, violence is called for 
because it is not natural for human beings to live peacefully together.  The 
religious elements of the founding of Rome by Romulus are systematically 
stripped from Machiavelli’s re-telling of it.  They only reappear as something 
secondary, added Numa, not at all essential to the virtue of the Romans which is 
derived mainly from Romulus’ good arms.  Indeed, although Machiavelli will 
praise the Romans for their use of religion, this praise is not praise of piety per 
se, but of the clever political use of the piety of others.  When he first broaches 
the topic, Machiavelli remarks that the religion founded by Numa served to 
‘make easier whatever enterprise the Senate or the great men of Rome might 
plan to make.’36  So religion may profitably be used to arouse an army, or keep 
order in the city.  But one should note here that this is a political religion whose 
aims and goals are derived not from the will of the gods but from the will of the 
political leadership: 
 
Among the other auspices they had in their armies certain orders of augers 
whom they called chicken-men; and whenever they were ordered to do 
battle with the enemy, they wished the chicken-men to take their auspices.  
If the chickens ate, they engaged in combat with a good augury, if they did 
                                                          
34 Machiavelli, The Prince, op.cit, VI, p. 20 and XII, p. 39.  
35 Machiavelli, Discourses, op. cit. I.9, pp. 116-118. 
36 Machiavelli, Discourses, op. cit. I.11, pp. 122. 
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not eat, they abstained from the fight.  Nonetheless, when reason showed 
them a thing they ought to do – notwithstanding that the auspices had been 
adverse – they did it in any mode.  But they turned it around with means 
and modes so aptly that it did not appear that they had done it with disdain 
for religion.37 
 
So, for Machiavelli religion is not an ur-phenomenon founding capable of 
founding political life; instead it is an epiphenomenon of politics.  As such, for 
Machiavelli there is no trans-historical foundation or essence of politics in the 
religious or theological sense.  We have discussed Machiavelli’s treatment of 
religion and politics at length for two reasons.  First, it demonstrates the broad 
contours of his political theory especially regarding the importance of coercion 
or violence.  Second, it prepares the way for our treatment of Machiavelli’s 
account of philosophy.  Taken together, his treatment of philosophy and religion 
discredit the two major sources of trans-historical justification for political life.  
Turning to his Florentine Histories, we can find Machiavelli reflecting on the 
relationship between philosophy and political life.   
There, in book V, Machiavelli observes that “letters come after arms 
and that, in provinces and cities, captains arise before philosophers.”38  
Philosophy is the product of the leisure time provided by the security and 
stability of good arms.  Moreover, philosophy is a threat to civic virtù insofar as 
it offers an honorable leisure that distracts men from the affairs of the city, 
Machiavelli writes: “For as good and well ordered armies give birth to victories 
and victories to quiet, the strength of well-armed spirits cannot be corrupted by a 
more honorable leisure than that of letters, nor can leisure enter into well-
instituted cities with a great and more dangerous deceit than this one.”39 
Philosophy is corruptive for two reasons.  First, it teaches error insofar as it 
focuses on ‘imagined republics’ rather than la verità effetuale and attempts to 
draw normative standards and evaluate politics on the basis of a fantasy.  
Second, it suggests that the philosophical activity is more noble and worthy than 
that of the captain or founder, embracing the role of unarmed prophet.  Since the 
unarmed prophet always comes to ruin, a city populated by philosophers too will 
suffer.    With this in mind, he praises the foresight of Cato for the expulsion of 
the philosophers Diogenes and Carneades from Rome.  In the same passages 
Machiavelli argues that philosophers only truly become wise when they have 
                                                          
37 Machiavelli, Discourses, I.14, pp. 131-132; see the discussion in John Najemy “Papirius and the 
Chickens, or Machiavelli on the Necessity of Interpreting Religion” in Journal of the History of Ideas 
60.4, 1999, pp. 659-681. 
38 Machiavelli, Florentine Histories, V.1, p.773. 
39 Machiavelli, Florentine Histories, V.1, p. 773. 
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been ruined and forced to acknowledge the importance of the security and 
stability provided by la verità effetuale. 
The above discussion of religion and philosophy shows that Machiavelli 
sees politics as (a) separate from religion or philosophy and (b) prior to and more 
fundamental than religion or philosophy.  Rather than evaluate regimes by a 
standard derived from a philosophical account of nature or theology, these are 
secondary phenomena created and managed by the regime.  Instead, Machiavelli 
sees the various regimes and societies primarily in historical or sociological 
terms.  In this he has much in common with critical theory.  However, 
Machiavelli realizes that the turn towards history is also a turn towards violence: 
since political life lack religious or natural foundations, it must rely on the ability 
of a founder to bind people together; this ability, among other things, is denoted 
by the term virtù.   The centrality of virtù will raise a number of problems for 
Feenberg. 
 
 
PART THREE: The Artificial State: Virtù and Fortuna 
 
Virtù is the central piece of Machiavelli’s politics.  According to the first chapter 
of The Prince, all princes come to power either through virtue or fortune; in the 
Discourses on Livy he is consistently concerned with analyzing the rise and fall 
of Roman civic virtue.  The third book of the Discourses, however, focuses 
mainly on the virtue of individual captains, or princes, pointing the reader of the 
Discourses towards The Prince.40  As The Prince continues, we arrive at the 
distinction, mentioned above, between the armed prophet and the unarmed 
prophet.  The armed prophet, according to Machiavelli, is characterized by the 
ability to make people obey who no longer believe in you, i.e. the ability to force 
obedience.  It is worth mentioning that Machiavelli includes Romulus in his list 
of armed prophets.41  The unarmed prophet, on the other hand, lacks this ability 
– he or she is instead at the mercy of the crowd who only obey so long as they 
are inclined to do so.  According to Machiavelli, unarmed prophets always come 
to ruin.  More importantly for our purposes, the unarmed prophet relies on 
fortuna for his or her success, while the armed prophet relies on virtù.42  This 
                                                          
40 The precise relationship between these two texts is notoriously controversial and I will not say 
much about it in this context.  For our purposes it suffices to note similar arguments in each book and 
that each book claims to teach everything Machiavelli knows: see the respective Epistles Dedicatory 
to The Prince and The Discourses on Livy. 
41 Machiavelli, The Prince, VI, p. 20. 
42 Machiavelli, The Prince, VI, p. 20. 
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establishes a close connection between virtù and force; this is expanded upon by 
his reference to the virtuous cruelty of Hannibal and Agathocles.43  This virtuous 
cruelty is sudden, devastating and quickly over; it accomplishes its goals in a 
minimum amount of time, allowing the prince to spend most of his time on other 
things.  Hannibal was able to control his polyglot army in difficult circumstances 
because of ‘cruelty and infinite other virtues’; Agothocles was able to rise to 
power through his cruel execution of the leading citizens of Syracuse.  In both 
cases, as in other cases of cruelty praised by Machiavelli, the cruelty is not used 
for its own sake, but for the sake of establishing or retaining order.  The example 
of Cesare Borgia is particularly apt here: his governor was ordered both to kill 
threats to the stability of the Romagna and to establish law courts.44  It is not 
meaningless cruelty that Machiavelli endorses but cruelty that binds a people 
together. Here we should recall Romulus’ murder of Remus, which Machiavelli 
justified by appealing to the need for a founder of new modes and orders to be 
alone.  Machiavelli’s defense of cruelty follows from his turn towards history 
which bracketed philosophical or theological arguments for the naturalness of 
political life.  Political life has to be manufactured because it is neither natural 
nor ordained by God: cruelty, or more generally force, is necessary to found and 
preserve regimes. Machiavelli’s defense of Remus’ murderer as part of the 
founding of Rome should be understood as the companion to his defense of 
grizzly killings to reform and preserve the state: 
 
Notable among such executions, before the taking of Rome by the French, 
were the death of Maelius the grain dealer, after the taking of Rome it was 
the death of Manlius Capitolinus, the death of the son of Manlius 
Torquatus, the execution of Papirius Cursor against his master of the 
cavalrymen Fabius, and the accusation of the Scipios.  Because they were 
excessive and notable, such things made men draw back to the mark 
whenever one of them arose, and when they became more rare, they also 
began to give more space to men to corrupt themselves and to behave with 
greater danger and more tumult.45 
 
                                                          
43 See Machiavelli, The Prince, VIII, p. 31 and XVII, p. 55, as well as Discourses III, 21-22, p. 368-
375. 
44 Machiavelli, The Prince, VII, p. 24-25 and XVII, p. 53 ; see too the discussion in M. Viroli, 
Machiavelli, New York, Oxford UP, 1998, pp. 53-56. 
45 Machiavelli, Discourses, III.1, p. 311. 
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The killing of his son by Manlius Torquatus is later cited by Machiavelli as an 
example of how one person’s virtue can restore order and discipline in the 
people.46 
 Machiavellian virtù, then, includes a judicious use of cruelty and force.  
It is characteristic of virtue to ensure obedience through well used cruelty, as the 
case of Hannibal, as well as Torquatus, are used to illustrate in book III of the 
Discourses.  In a like manner, in The Prince, the armed prophet is distinguished 
from the unarmed prophet on precisely this score, the ability to force others to 
obey.  Not surprisingly then, Machiavelli characterizes the armed prophet as one 
who relies on virtue and the unarmed prophet as relying on fortune in their 
respective rises to power.  However, so far virtue has only been presented as the 
ability to force other human beings to obey; in the penultimate chapter of the The 
Prince however, Machiavelli expands on this, associating virtue not simply with 
the conquest of other people, but with the conquest of fortune.  Machiavelli goes 
on to illustrate this idea with two rather graphic examples.  The first involves the 
controlling of floods as typically virtuouso action; the second describes fortune 
as a woman who must be beat if she is to obey.   Fortune is something that can be 
mastered, at least to a degree, if one is audacious enough to beat her – in other 
words, the conquest of fortune is characterized by the same sort of virtù that 
characterized the armed prophet.  This second example links the previous 
presentation of virtue as commanding the obedience of other people to the 
presentation in this chapter of virtue as commanding the obedience of fortune: 
the judicious use of cruelty can be directed towards nature as much as other 
people.  The first example describes the damning and redirecting of rivers as an 
instance of the virtuous person who prudently plans ahead and prevents nature 
sive fortune from wrecking havoc on his life and plans:  
 
And I liken her [fortune] to one of those violent rivers which, when 
they become angry, flood the plain, destroy trees and buildings, 
remove the earth from one place and deposit it in another; everyone 
flees their advance, everybody surrenders to their impetus, unable to 
oppose it in any way.  And although these things are so, it does not 
follow that men, when there are quiet times, cannot therefore make 
provisions with defense and embankments in such a mode that, rising 
later, either they will go through a canal, or their impetus would not 
be so licentious or harmful47 
 
                                                          
46 Machiavelli, Discourses, III.19, pp. 366-367. 
47 Machiavelli, The Prince, XXV, p. 80. 
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 This is perhaps the most suggestive of Machiavelli’s images for virtù; the 
application of political virtù to the control of floods might arguable be seen as a 
manifesto for a certain kind of technopolitics. Interestingly in his ‘Question 
Concerning Technology’ Martin Heidegger uses the image of a hydro-electric 
dam on the Rhine River to illustrate the technological revealing of the world as a 
resource.48   This is a point we will return to later, but we can already point to a 
connection between the political control of other people and the technological 
control of nature in Machiavelli’s concept of virtù: it is the task of virtù to 
command both other people and the natural world.  
If we return to the first book of Discourses we find Machiavelli’s most 
sustained treatment of nature.  Here he is concerned primarily with the choice of 
locations for cities.  Machiavelli considers the advantages and disadvantages of 
fertile grounds and less hospitable places insofar as the development of civic 
virtue is concerned.  One should note that this is not a worry found in Livy: when 
Livy considers the geography of Rome, he is only concerned to identify which 
were the first hills to be settled.49  Machiavelli worries that settling in fertile 
areas will free people from the necessity of working hard to support their lives 
and that of their families, enabling them to live a life of leisure (ozio) rather than 
virtue.  In these areas the population does not have to work hard and cultivate the 
sort of political structures needed for a city to thrive because the fertility of the 
area will remove the need for such structures.  We should note here that 
Machiavelli assumes the one will not cultivate virtue without compulsion – 
people are not good, but instead, as he constantly re-iterates, most people are 
bad, interested only in material goods, not virtue for its own sake.  As he says in 
The Prince: “For one can say this generally of men: that they are ungrateful, 
fickle, hypocrites and dissemblers, evaders of danger, lovers of gain”50  On the 
other hand, settling in an infertile and inhospitable location will force the people 
to cultivate such structures, but at the same time the lesser quality of the land will 
not be able to support a flourishing population and leave the city weak and 
insecure.  Neither horn of this dilemma then is particularly suited to the 
cultivation of political life.  The world is not constructed in a way hospitable to 
politics.  Machiavelli’s solution to this problem is to choose the fertile grounds 
but to create an artificial necessity to make up for the lack of natural necessity: in 
other words, since the people are not forced by the land to work hard, the leader 
or founder should force the people to work hard:  
 
                                                          
48 Heidegger, “Question concerning technology”, pp. 16. 
49 Livy, AUC, I.6.4. 
50 Machiavelli, The Prince,  XVII, p. 54. 
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Those [founders] should be imitated who have inhabited very agreeable 
and fertile countries, apt to produce men who are idle and unfit for any 
virtuous exercise, and who have had the wisdom to prevent the harms that 
the agreeableness of the country would have caused through idleness by 
imposing the necessity to exercise on those who had to be soldiers51 
 
This artificial necessity overcomes the fertility of the land to create a situation 
where the people live as if they had to work hard to sustain their lives when in 
fact they do not.  This artificial necessity is the result of the virtù of the founder – 
such as Romulus – who overcomes the limitations of the natural environment to 
create the ideal political environment, i.e. one where the exercise of virtue 
demanded by artificial necessity despite the lack of natural necessity in the land.  
When considering the virtue of the founder, we should recall the afore discussed 
account of Romulus and the ‘natural and ordinary necessity’ that a new prince 
must hurt those he rules over.52  
If we juxtapose the discussions in The Prince with that of the Discourse 
we see that the principle task of virtue is to forcefully, if not cruelly, remake the 
world to meet our goals and desires, inclusive of the creation of artificial 
necessities when natural necessities are lacking.  Virtue is not living in 
accordance with nature, as the ancients thought, but instead it is remaking nature 
so that it is in accordance with one’s plans.  Indeed, in both examples, nature 
presents us with a problem to be solved: the raging river or the deleterious effects 
of a too easy life.  The task of virtù is to solve the problems presented to us by 
nature: nature appears in Machiavelli as an enemy which must be conquered.  If 
that image seems too strong, one might instead say that nature appears as a 
resource which must be controlled.  Whether one prefers the stronger or the 
weaker image, we are far from the ancient or medieval view of nature as 
something to be imitated or admired as God’s creation and much closer to 
Heidegger’s account of the technological Gestell.   For the same reason, we are 
far from the view of virtue as living in accordance with nature or the natural law; 
Machiavellian virtù asserts itself against nature through the creation of the 
artificial.  In particular, political life and virtue are no longer understood as 
natural, but as the first technologies.  Machiavelli rejects the view that there is a 
pre-established order which it is the task of humanity to adapt themselves too 
and that happiness is to be found in such an adaptation.  Instead, Machiavelli 
argues that human flourishing is found only by overcoming the natural, 
reshaping it to fit one’s goals and objectives.  In short, Machiavelli denies that 
                                                          
51 Machiavelli, Discourses, I.1, p. 93. 
52 Machiavelli, The Prince, III, p. 6. 
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nature is normative; instead, nature is a material to be worked over by virtuous 
people in pursuit of certain goals.  Machiavelli conceives of this working over of 
nature primarily in terms of virtù, rather than poesis.  We can note that the 
taming of nature is accomplished primarily through the artificial: either one 
constructs devices for controlling the rivers, or one constructs laws to counter act 
the effects of fertile land.   Virtue manifests itself in the artificial, which is to say, 
the technological.  Moreover, the first task of virtue vis-à-vis nature, the first 
artificial thing which must be created is society itself.  It is not natural for human 
beings to live together in peace: this peace, as we have seen is precarious and 
only acquired or preserved through the application of virtù.   
 
 
PART FOUR: A Machiavellian Extension and Critique of Feenberg 
 
In the second and third parts of this paper, I argued that for Machiavelli politics 
is divorced from, and primary to, religious belief or philosophical doctrine.  The 
primacy of the political upon further analysis was discovered to be a primacy of 
virtù.  In turn, the primacy of virtue was shown to be a technological primacy, 
i.e. that virtue ultimately consists in remaking the world to suit our plans in a 
manner not entirely unlike Heidegger’s Gestell.  Earlier we saw that Feenberg 
has argued that many of Heidegger’s complaints about technology are misplaced: 
the problem is not technology per se but the economic and political structures 
that employ and deploy those technologies.53  A change in those structures might 
solve many of the problems critics of technology associate with technology.  A 
change is possible, according to Feenberg, because there is neither natural nor 
metaphysical-religious necessity undergirding the present political system.  In 
this, he is in agreement with Machiavelli, but does not go as far in thinking 
through the implications of this position as Machiavelli did.   
Our reading of Machiavelli suggests that political regimes are not 
natural, but artificial and the foundation of these regimes partakes of neither 
natural nor supernatural motivation, as the relationship between Romulus and 
Numa shows, but instead cruelty and violence.  Connected to the artificial 
construction of politics is the centrality of virtue.   As we saw above, the task of 
virtù is, among other things, the conquest of nature and other human beings.  
Since living together is not natural for human beings, they must be forced to do 
                                                          
53 I will not enter into the details of Feenberg’s reading of Heidegger.  For Feenberg’s reading and 
critique of Heidegger, see Questioning Technology, pp.183-199; for a critical discussion of that issue, 
see, I. Thompson, "From the Question Concerning Technology to the Quest for a Democratic 
Technology: Heidegger, Marcuse, Feenberg", in Inquiry 43:2, 2000, pp. 203-216.   
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so by a virtuouso such as Romulus who, with good arms, will force them to 
abide by his good laws.  Machiavelli shows that when politics is divorced from 
nature, there is no reason to suppose that people will live together voluntarily or 
peacefully: the foundation of the state can only be good arms.  Moreover, if 
political life is not natural, then there is no ‘natural’ or best regime.  
Machiavelli’s discussion of tyrannical and republican modes of government 
provide a particularly vivid example of the application of this insight.  The 
choice between tyranny and republics is largely one of pragmatics for 
Machiavelli: his preference for republics is not based on the claim that republics 
are more just or better at defending the rights of citizens.  A republic is no more 
natural or just than a tyranny insofar as they both precede and create the moral 
standards by which they are judged.  The preference for republics lies only in 
their greater stability and security, i.e. in the pragmatic benefits a republic 
confers. In the same way, we find Feenberg’s mentor, Marcuse, basing his 
endorsement of an alternate society on ultimately pragmatic grounds: “The 
established ways of organizing society is measured against other possible ways, 
which are held to offer better chances of alleviating man’s struggle for 
existence.” 54 
Returning to Feenberg, his anti-essentialist views about technology 
merely apply a broader anti-essentialist account of politics derived from 
Marcuse: political life can be restructured and improved for pragmatic benefits 
because there is no natural political order.  If the current political order produces 
negative consequences in its use of technology, an alternate order could be 
constructed that will produce positive outcomes.  The malleability of politics 
suggests that Feenberg accepts, although perhaps without meaning to, the 
Machiavellian divorce between nature and politics.  However, Feenberg – and 
Marcuse as well – seem rather naïve when their thought is juxtaposed to that of 
Machiavelli; while Machiavelli would agree with Feenberg that the positive or 
negative effects of technology can be managed by altering regimes, the 
Machiavellian argument would go further to argue that the lack of philosophical 
or theological foundations for politics implies the necessity of virtù in forcing 
people to accept this or that regime – even a republic. This means that there will 
always be coercion.  Since there will always be coercion, Feenberg’s ideal of a 
technological regime where people are ‘free and independent’ is impossible: if 
society if artificial – which the constructivist argument seems to presuppose – 
then one cannot assume that it is held together either by natural impulse or 
metaphysical principles.  Instead, it is created through the application of virtue to 
                                                          
54 Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, op. cit., xlii. 
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the people.  Of course, Feenberg could, and probably would argue that his vision 
of a reformed modernity need not be coercive but is instead emancipatory.55  But 
Machiavelli would argue that this leaves him in the camp of the unarmed 
prophet, for history shows that if Feenberg is not willing to coerce, someone else 
will be.  This is the lesson Machiavelli draws from the fate of his former superior 
Soderini, who lost power to the Medici because he was unwilling to use 
extraordinary (i.e. coercive and violent) means to preserve it.56   This is not to 
embrace the ‘dystopian’ view of technology Feenberg attributes to Heidegger, 
Ellul and others, but to point out the dark side of the philosopher’s desire for 
emancipation or liberation insofar as it comes after the desire for security has 
been satisfied, and that security rests on virtù.57   An entirely emancipated 
politics would be a politics without virtù and come to ruin since people, in 
general, are not good and must be forced to be good.  If technological liberation 
were possible such that all people were capable of ‘free and independent lives’ it 
would return us to the dilemma of the fertile land where people have no reason to 
live together. 
Feenberg argues persuasively that technology’s meaning and effect can 
be altered by altering the society in which technology is used.  Machiavelli 
shows that while technology is a social construct, the possibilities of altering the 
social structures that conditions its usage are quite slim.  The domineering and 
                                                          
55 See Feenberg, Questioning Technology, op. cit., pp. 224-225;  Feenberg’s optimism is criticized by 
Tyler Veak in “Whose Technology?  Whose Modernity? Questioning Feenberg's Questioning 
Technology”, in Science, Technology, & Human Values 25.2, 2000, pp. 226-237.  According to 
Veak, Feenberg misreads and overplays the success of the environmentalist movement, which he 
adduces as evidence for the possibility of a political transformation of technology.  Feenberg’s 
response to Veak can be found in the same issue. For another account of technological liberation see 
Manuel Fernández del Riesgo “¿Ciberdemocracia, Utopía o Posible Realidad?”, in Argumentos de 
Razón Técnica 10, 2007, pp. 239-249.  According to him, it is imperative that citizens living in our 
globalized and technological society take control of these technologies such that they can become a 
means of liberation and create new social reality and political institutions. Machiavelli would point 
out the creation of new institutions, or the reform of old ones, is never entirely libratory but always 
includes some coercive measures.  
56 Machiavelli, Discourses, III.30, pp. 337-338.  Of Soderini, Machiavelli writes: “He did not know 
that one cannot wait for the time, goodness is not enough, fortune varies and malignity does not find 
a gift that appeases it.” The remarks of Paul Virilio on sociology, a discipline close to the heart of 
critical theory seem appropriate here: “People often tell me: you reason in a political way, like the 
Ancients. It's true. I don't believe in sociology. It's a mask. Sociology was invented in order to forget 
politics. For me, all that is social, sociology, doesn't interest me. I prefer politics and war.”  (Paul 
Virilio, Pure War (rev. edition, trans. Mark Polizzotti, Postscript translated by Brian O'Keeffe), New 
York,  Semiotext(e), 1997, p. 17. 
57 For Feenberg’s discussion of ‘Left Dystopianism’ see Questioning Technology, pp. 4-10; for his 
critique of Heidegger’s dystopianism, pp. 183-187. 
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controlling aspects of technology are symptoms of the fundamental constitution 
of political life.   Since Machiavelli is a philosopher without a metaphysics,58 his 
claim is not that technology is metaphysically determined to function in this way, 
but that the political and social formation of technology goes much deeper than 
Feenberg realizes.  Feenberg’s critical theory partakes of this vision but is unable 
or unwilling to note the Machiavellian corollaries to this principle.  It is not late 
modern global capitalism that directs technology towards objectifying and 
controlling forms, but the historical constitution of politics divorced from nature 
and metaphysics.   
                                                          
58 See too Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, xliii: “It [critical theory] is opposed to all metaphysics by 
virtue of the rigorously historical character of the transcendence.”  I am especially indebted to 
Michael R. Kelly of the Department of Philosophy at Boston College for helpful comments on this 
paper. 
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